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Review Article: Non-Ideal Climate Justice 
Eric Brandstedt* 
Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS), London School of Economics and 
Political Science, London, UK 
Based on three recently published books on climate justice, this article reviews the 
field of climate ethics in light of developments of international climate politics. The 
central problem addressed is how idealised normative theories can be relevant to 
the political process of negotiating a just distribution of the costs and benefits of 
mitigating climate change. I distinguish three possible responses, that is, three 
kinds of non-ideal theories of climate justice: focused on (1) the injustice of some 
agents not doing their part; (2) the policy process and aiming to be realistic; and 
(3) grievances related to the transition to a clean-energy economy. The 
methodological discussion underpinning each response is innovative and should 
be of interest more generally, even though it is still underdeveloped. The practical 
upshot, however, is unclear: even non-ideal climate justice may be too 
disconnected from the fast-moving and messy climate circus.  
Keywords: non-ideal theory, climate injustice, transitional climate justice, realistic 
climate justice, noncompliance, climate justice 
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I. Introduction 
Climate change already causes great economic losses, extreme hardship and premature death by 
inducing droughts, crop failures, and other detrimental effects. If nothing is done, it will get 
worse: extreme weather events will become more frequent, and in the worst-case scenario, 
present an existential threat. To mitigate such dangers the nation states of the world have 
accepted to ‘[hold] the increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-
industrial levels and [to pursue] efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-
industrial levels’, as part of the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2015, Art. 2.1). They have also 
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approved that meeting this goal requires net-zero emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the 
second half of this century.  
The aforementioned agreement is effectively a normative decision about the right 
balance of probability-weighted costs and benefits of measures to reduce emissions and those of 
other policy objectives, including how much to spend on adaptation to unmitigated climate 
change. It furthermore has normative implications in the sense that it raises questions about 
how to meet the target, and who should do what, and how fast it should be done. Transitioning 
to a clean-energy economy will entail both large costs and large non-climate benefits that should 
be fairly distributed.  
Ideally, normative theory should be relevant to answering such questions. A theory of 
climate justice, that is, a set of principles for distributing the goods and burdens of climate 
change mitigation, could function as an aspirational goal for the just transformation of the 
current fossil fuel economy. But in the current state of climate politics it is easy to despair – also 
about normative theory. Although the Paris Agreement may turn things around, climate politics 
has been and is still to a large extent in a deadlock. Many actors dig in their heels: refuse to act 
fairly, act as first mover, or even act at all. In this situation, it is unclear what impact 
philosophical analyses, however sophisticated, could have. What Brian Barry (2003, p. 498) 
wrote in a different context rings true here: ‘whether we make the demands of justice more or 
less stringent, it is going to demand more than is likely to get done in the foreseeable future’.  
In response to such worries, one may seek resort in what is known as ‘non-ideal theory’. 
Perhaps climate ethicists – that is, normative theorists working on climate change – have been 
too preoccupied with developing ideal theories, and should now focus their efforts on more 
practically relevant tasks. Such an idea can be distinguished in the collected works Climate 
Justice: Vulnerability and Protection (2014) that Henry Shue recently has put together. Similarly, 
a whole third of Dominic Roser and Christian Seidel’s just published Climate Justice: An 
Introduction (2017) is devoted to questions about how ethical ideals can and should be put to 
political practice. Moreover, as the title gives away, it is centrally featured in the anthology 
Climate Justice in a Non-Ideal World (2016) that Clare Heyward and Dominic Roser have edited. 
It has also been the topic of some journal articles: Hohl and Roser (2011), Maltais (2013, 2014), 
Caney (2005, 2016a), Gajevic Sayegh (2016). 
In this article, I will review the discussion of non-ideal climate justice with the primary 
aim of clarifying the central concepts therein. This is pertinent because the idea of non-ideal 
theory – and its opposite, ideal theory – is far from clear. I will thus begin by disambiguating it 
and highlighting the different ways it has been put to use in the discussion of climate justice. 
Thereby, I also hope to contribute to an assessment of the role of climate ethics in relation to 
climate politics.  
 
II. Disambiguating the Distinction 
I should first set aside a common usage of ‘non-ideal’ in discussions of climate justice. That is, 
when it is to signify the difficult nature of the problem; or, in the words of Aaron Maltais (2013, 
p. 598), the ‘extremely unfavourable conditions for effective climate politics’. Although what is 
referred to here must be accounted in the implementation and possibly even justification of 
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climate justice, the expression should not be confused with that of non-ideal theory. Also note 
that this expression can be confusing also after this clarification. Seeing that the dictionary 
definition of ‘non-ideal’ is ‘real’, all real-world conditions, however difficult or easy to overcome, 
are non-ideal in this sense. So, if one wants to isolate the specific character of climate politics, it 
is better to use another term, such as ‘difficult’, ‘problematic’, or perhaps ‘wicked’. 
From here on, I will reserve ‘non-ideal’ to name a particular kind of normative theory, 
and examine three different interpretations of it in the climate justice discussion, concerned 
with partial compliance (in section III), realism (in section IV), and transition (in section V), 
respectively. The tripartite structure comes from the three senses of the distinction between 
ideal and non-ideal theory that Laura Valentini (2012) has pointed out. That is, first, as a 
distinction between full and partial compliance with normative principles theorised.1 One can 
either work out normative principles on the assumption that all agents can and will comply to 
the extent that is possible and reasonable for them to do so, or on the assumption that there is or 
will be some noncompliance, that is, some agents not doing what they should. Non-ideal theory, 
in this sense, concerns how to respond to injustice. Secondly, it has been understood as a 
distinction between more utopian and more realistic normative theories. There is a question 
about to what extent various feasibility constraints or facts should be taken into account in 
normative theorising. Thirdly, it has been understood as the difference between focusing on the 
end-state of a perfectly just society, or on transitional concerns about improvements from the 
status quo.  
 
III. Dealing with Climate Injustice 
The partial compliance interpretation is probably the most common one among climate ethicists 
(see Caney 2005, 2016a, 2016b, Hohl and Roser 2011, Shue 2014, ch. 15, Roser and Seidel 2017, 
ch. 17). And not without reason: The apparent disregard for climate change that characterises 
world politics suggests that questions about how to deal with climate injustice are central. It 
seems less relevant to try and work out the precise details of principles of climate justice when 
agents today cannot plausibly be said to comply with any, however modest, requirements of 
justice. Furthermore, as Shue (2014, ch. 9) argues, the commonly discussed ideal principles 
perhaps anyhow converge on the same policy prescriptions.  
What is important to note, then, is that this raises new and distinct ethical 
considerations. Questions about how to deal with non-compliers cannot be swept aside as 
merely practical matters; they are of moral significance and in need of a separate, non-ideal 
theory of climate justice. As Simon Caney (2016a, p. 12) notes, the existence of noncompliance 
implies a shortfall of justice, which leads to the question: ‘Where should the shortfall lie?’ In 
order to determine this and to thus develop a non-ideal theory of climate justice, Caney (2016a) 
proposes a three-step methodology.  
The first step is to list possible responses to noncompliance. Note that these are often 
discussed in terms of the fairness of demanding of compliers to ‘take up the slack’ of non-
compliers. One response is that it would be unfair because fairness determines invariable 
shares. But one may also argue that the existence of noncompliance does affect the ideally fair 
distribution of responsibility: either, as some state representatives less plausibly have claimed2, 
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by freeing compliers from responsibility (as it is conditional on some level of compliance), or by 
increasing responsibility, such that, compliers are now required to do even more (see e.g. Caney 
2005, pp. 767-772). Sabine Hohl and Dominic Roser (2011) suggest another possibility: that 
although it would be unfair to demand of compliers to do more than their fair share, they are 
still so required because each additional burden3 shouldered makes it less likely that human 
rights are violated as a result of climate change. Roser and Seidel (2017, pp. 170-171) similarly 
concede the unfairness of compliers having to shoulder residual burdens, but argue that it must 
be balanced against a much worse injustice, namely that of allowing great harm being inflicted 
on third parties (i.e. the effects of climate change on future people). Caney (2016b) expands and 
develops the standard set of responses, adding, among other things, the possibility of relaxing 
moral side-constraints on action and of changing the incentive structure to increase future 
compliance.  
The second step responds to the need to evaluate and choose between the possible 
responses. Like many in the general discussion (e.g. Rawls 1999, p. 90; cf. Simmons 2010), Caney 
(2016a) argues that this must be met with ideal theory. Non-ideal theory presupposes ideal 
theory: the aim of the former is to approximate the latter. There are two things to note here. 
First, by implication, it is not enough to just assume (as I did above) that present agents have not 
complied with their responsibilities on most theories of justice; the evaluation of appropriate 
responses depends on a more specified ideal theory. The second thing is that, at least for Caney, 
there seems to be a strict partitioning between ideal and non-ideal theory. As far as the 
development of the latter goes, ideal principles are not revisable, but insensitive to facts and 
intuitions related to the application. Non-ideal theorising is thus not a matter of testing ideals 
against reality and possibly adjusting them accordingly. It is rather applying an independently 
justified theory of justice. The aim is to deal with climate injustices in ways conducive to the 
ultimate objective of an ideal theory. It is always the ideals prescribed that should inform the 
treatment of noncompliance: agents must ask themselves whether a particular course of action 
will be an ethically acceptable (as judged by the ideal), efficient and effective step towards the 
ideal. There can be no compromising of the ideal.  
In the third step of his account of non-ideal climate justice, Caney argues that one must 
attend to what is (politically) feasible for differently positioned agents, such as governments, 
firms, and individuals. Depending on the individual agent’s action space, different actions will be 
called for by the non-ideal theory of climate justice. The government of a well-positioned and 
affluent nation state will need to take actions different from those of a potential victim of climate 
change, such as an individual farmer in a developing country. The former may need to take on 
extra mitigation burdens or help finance an institutional framework to encourage future 
compliance (what Caney calls ‘Changing the Incentives Structure’). The latter may be permitted 
certain acts of civil disobedience, for instance, to take possession of certain low-carbon 
technology (‘Burden Shifting II’). These facts are relevant to determining what is an efficient and 
effective step towards the ideal. So although ultimate principles of justice are abstracted away 
from the facts on the ground, on Caney’s theory, their application is not. 
Thus, although all considered agents are required to comply with one and the same ideal 
theory, different agents may be required to do different things in response to noncompliance. 
How and why will their obligations differ? The answer is given by ideal theory.4 If it prescribes, 
say, that all agents should enjoy comparable opportunities to lead a good life, then those with 
fewer opportunities should shoulder fewer additional burdens, and vice versa. Residual 
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responsibility would, accordingly, be distributed in accordance with ability to take on additional 
burdens, subtracting what is needed to lead a good life. Given the opening for a plurality of 
different ideal theories, each with their distinct non-ideal auxiliaries, it is a striking fact that 
climate ethicists generally support some such cosmopolitan egalitarianism coupled with some 
such ability-based principle for residual responsibility.5 
One can also challenge the premises of the take-up-the-slack-understanding of partial 
compliance theory. Caney’s non-ideal theory, in a way, does so by drawing on the 
multidimensional and dynamic character of real-life decisions.6 He rightly notes that the action 
space is variable, which enables positive or negative incentive effects: additional burdens 
carried by compliers can make it more or less likely that non-compliers will come to comply too. 
But it is even clearer with Aaron Maltais (2014), who argues that the problem is more 
fundamental than what has been assumed so far: there is a set of ‘non-ideal burdens’, actions 
that are costly in the short term but necessary to make an effective international response to 
climate change politically feasible, and it is these that must be distributed fairly. Such a 
distribution, Maltais (2014) argues, requires economically powerful states to show ‘climate 
leadership’ by taking unilateral actions, because they are well connected to the problem and 
have the capacity to effectuate structural change.7 Maltais is right in problematizing the non-
ideal problem: the default framing certainly seems like a misrepresentation of a situation in 
which almost no one complies. But it should be noted that one thereby leaves the partial 
compliance interpretation of non-ideal theory. Maltais’s (2014) discussion of the normative 
ground of climate leadership is of a different kind. It is more akin to the second interpretation of 
non-ideal theory, to which I will now turn.  
 
IV. Realistic Climate Justice 
An ironic twist of the partial compliance interpretation is that its suggested treatment of 
noncompliance risks furthering even more noncompliance. If compliers are required to shoulder 
residual burdens of non-compliers, their motivation is tested, and, if stretched to its limit, the 
result could be yet more noncompliance, not only with the additional, residual burden, but also 
with respect to the initial, ideal burden. Of course, this need not happen, but one can think of 
cases more generally where it seems likely, such as when one of two younger siblings defaults 
on a joint enterprise and leaves the other to singlehandedly bear the full burden. It is anyhow 
surprising that non-ideal theory thus understood may be more demanding than ideal theory. 
Why would making the demands of justice more stringent make it more likely that they are met 
in the future, one is inclined to ask.  
Whether or not this has been the reason, some climate ethicists have used non-ideal 
climate justice in a radically different sense. The proposals considered in this section all, in 
different ways, challenge the standard modus operandi of climate ethics and call for a 
rapprochement to climate policy. Even if not all of these proposals are meant to replace existing 
ideal theories – they, at least, question standard methodological choices and defend alternative 
ways of doing climate ethics. The common core is realism: start with an accurate description of 
people, politics and policies and then evaluate and make normative proposals. The difficulty, of 
course, is doing that without too much of a concession to realpolitik. That is, to avoid reducing 
normative principles to political strategy, and being apologetic of the status quo. 
 7 
Alexandre Gajevic Sayegh (2016) points out a first, less radical, way in which principles 
of climate justice should be realistic: they need to take into account the relevant empirical 
circumstances. Climate ethicists cannot – and do not – settle for only very abstract formulations 
of general principles of justice, such as the principle of equality. They take into account things 
like the currency of equality. An inattentive assumption of GHG emissions as the distribuendum 
to be equalised leads to implausible results, as some individuals reasonably need to emit more 
than others.8 Such facts should be taken into account, and so should of course the facts from 
climate science, and facts about how GHG emissions are measured, what incentive effects 
policies are likely to give rise to, etc. Only then can one hope to formulate principles of climate 
justice that are action guiding, as Gajevic Sayegh (2016) rightly points out. Indeed, otherwise 
one would not have formulated principles of climate justice at all. 
Nor should Roser’s (2016) proposal to ground climate protection in already existing 
motivation be controversial. His idea is ‘to choose the least unjust option within the bounds of 
motivation, however insufficient motivation may currently be’ (Roser 2016, p. 84). He further 
assumes that there are actions that provide better climate protection, yet are compatible with 
the limited motivation of present agents (he calls these ‘the motivation-compatible set of 
options’). These are actions (and policies) that are sometimes referred to as ‘no-regret options’ 
and ‘win-win options’ due to having co-benefits other than climate protection (e.g. cleaner air 
and fewer respiratory diseases) or directly saving costs (e.g. energy efficiency), but also ideas 
inspired by studies in psychology and behavioural economics, such as deferring the costs of 
climate action, ‘green nudges’, debiasing techniques, as well as a proposal to simplify the 
measurement of climate injustice: instead of a comprehensive evaluation one could focus only 
on the effects on world poverty and thus create a kind of ‘poverty index’ for climate action.9 Most 
of these proposals seem promising, which is hardly surprising given that they are designed to be 
just that.10 It is also easy to agree with Roser that: ‘Searching for, engaging in, and promoting 
such strategies is one of the weighty moral imperatives in an unjust world such as ours’ (2016, p. 
93). Climate ethicists should continue to engage in the kind of interdisciplinary work cognisant 
of the relevant political facts with moral reflection that Roser (2016) has set the example for.  
Maltais (2016) and Light and Taraska (2016) advance two similar approaches. Maltais 
(2016) argues that climate ethicists should focus less on ‘fine-tuning general distributive 
principles’, and more on the normative dimension of reforms proposed to overcome the political 
inertia (e.g. reforming the multilateralism of UNFCCC). By evaluating these, one could advance 
‘mediating strategies’, which, in a piecemeal manner, make the political situation more tractable. 
Similarly, Light and Taraska (2016) exemplifies policy-relevant climate ethics. They provide a 
rather detailed outline of the current pledge-and-review system of the Paris Agreement, and also 
characterise some of the domestic political obstacles to more ambitious commitments. On that 
basis, they propose a ‘workable option with significant potential’ (2016, p. 180): to phase out 
‘short-lived climate pollutants’.  
As with some of Roser’s proposals, it is hard to disagree. But what should be more 
controversial is the new role for the climate ethicist implicitly assumed. It seems to be that of 
steering politicians out of the current impasse by making concrete and here and now politically 
feasible recommendations. This role, which is similar to the policy analyst, is no doubt 
important, though not clearly one that climate ethicists should exclusively adopt. A 
consideration against is that it gives up on the central discussion of background injustice, that is, 
scrutinising how a number of individually fair and freely entered policies and agreements could 
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produce an injustice on the aggregate level; a ‘compound injustice’, in the words of Shue (2014, 
pp. 36-41). Another criticism is that such a bottom-up approach is too narrowly focused, and 
because of that fails to address spillover effects between different domains of concern. Even so, I 
do believe that climate ethicists should consider adopting it on the condition that they, like Light 
and Taraska, have insight into the policy process. But, then, be aware that it does not make the 
work of traditional normative theory obsolete.  
Martin Kowarsch and Ottmar Edenhofer’s (2016) ‘pathway exploration approach’ is to 
some extent similar to the ones just considered: climate ethicists should evaluate policy 
pathways, much like the policy analyst. But their more specific proposal, that the ethical 
discussion should be integrated in the assessments of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), suggests a different take on policy-relevant work. It must be squared with the 
mission statement of the IPCC, which among other things states that ‘[t]he work of the 
organization is therefore policy-relevant and yet policy-neutral, never policy-prescriptive’. If 
Kowarsch and Edenhofer’s proposal is simply to strengthen the evaluative assessments that are 
already a part of the IPCC11, then that is fine, but perhaps somewhat futile. But if it is to give the 
IPCC a more straightforward normative project, it is not compatible with the mission statement 
and likely to meet fierce resistance.12 Either way, if the ambition is to make climate ethics more 
practically relevant, it is more promising to follow Maltais, Light and Taraska in integrating it 
with relevant political practices, rather than with the scientific community. There is, however, 
one feature of Kowarsch and Edenhofer’s approach that I want to note: that the distinction 
between implementation and justification is blurred. They stress that ideal principles should be 
revised, if they cannot be implemented in any acceptable way. This may be an interesting 
contrast to some ideas discussed in the previous section.13  
Darrel Moellendorf (2016) also presents a policy-relevant approach to climate ethics. 
Because climate change is such an urgent issue, he argues, we cannot wait for a fully specified 
ideal theory, nor fall back on non-ideal theory (as that presupposes ideal theory).14 The only 
normative guidance possible thus is that of the norms nation states already are committed to in 
virtue of having ratified UNFCCC: The goods and burdens of climate change abatement should be 
distributed according to these norms. The obvious problem with such a proposal however is that 
by being a result of international diplomacy, the norms of UNFCCC are abstract and rather non-
committal. Take what is among the clearest norms prescribed in it (also Moellendorf’s example): 
‘the right to sustainable development’ (1992, Art. 3.4/4.7). This has been understood as 
recognising the claim of ‘Non-Annex I Parties’ (among them China, India, Brazil) to develop and 
grow their economies, even if that amounts to additional GHG emissions.15 But what actions are 
prescribed by that recognition is unclear, and so is the application of the concept of needs (more 
on this below). Moellendorf devotes considerable space to justifying that the norms should be 
taken seriously, but should rather have worried about explicating and specifying them. 
 
V. Transitional Climate Justice 
Consider again the reluctance of nation states, local governments, business and other relevant 
actors to take appropriate climate measures. The situation may be one in which ‘there is no 
allocation of GHG emissions […] that is both morally tolerable and, at present, politically feasible 
as long as most economies are dependent for energy upon carbon-based fuels, that is, fossil 
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fuels’ (Shue 2014, p. 225). If fairly dealing with climate change clashes with entrenched interests 
in the fossil fuel economy, there may be no practicable alternative but to aim for a technological 
solution, to make renewables, like wind and solar, competitive.16 The transition to a clean-
energy economy, however, also raises questions of justice. 
Shue (2014) makes a case for transitional climate justice. He notes that in the 
deadlocked political situation one must engage in incremental improvements on the status quo. 
This raises the question about what compromises are morally acceptable. A question that cannot 
be answered merely by pointing to ‘ultimate goals’: there is a need for ‘guidelines for transitions’ 
(Shue 2014, p. 58). Although such guidelines probably share some features of the principles for 
dealing with injustice (considered in section III), they nevertheless are of a different type. The 
‘transition’ is not, or at least not directly, to the ultimate goals of ideal theory.17 Rather, it is to a 
clean-energy economy. The theoretical focus is on giving ground to and justification for 
grievances such a transition may bring about. In this connection, Shue (2014, pp. 133-141) 
distinguishes between different ranges normative standards may take. With respect to some 
ideals a relatively long transition period is allowed before it ought to be fully complied with, 
with respect to others a much shorter one. Then, there are ‘minimum standards’, which ‘must be 
satisfied as quickly as is humanly possible’ (Shue 2014, p. 134). 
In numerous chapters, Shue (2014) argues for two minimum standards to form the 
transitional principles of climate justice. To govern the intergenerational dimension, he 
proposes a ‘do no harm’ principle, which prescribes precautionary actions to prevent harm from 
climate change being inflicted on future generations, irrespective of the relative probability of 
the harm above a certain minimum likelihood threshold (Shue 2014, chs. 8, 11, 12, 14, 16). And 
for the international distribution, a basic needs principle (Shue 2014, chs. 2, 6, 9, 17). These 
minimum standards could be described as sufficientarian. They set thresholds under which no 
one should fall: no one should suffer damage as a result of climate change and no one’s basic 
needs should be left unmet as a result of actions to mitigate climate change. Shue defends their 
correctness as guidelines for transitions without invoking a complete theory of justice.18  
But problems arise as one tries to specify what concrete climate policies they 
recommend. To apply Shue’s ‘do no harm’ principle it seems the current generation would need 
to just stop any GHG-generating activities: already the current stock of GHG is dangerous (cf. 
Shue 2014, p. 309, fn. 32). But why should we not take into account probabilities (even if they 
are hard to get at) and make comparisons to other policy objectives? It is at any rate not a 
minimum standard to recommend the prevention of any risk of harm. On the contrary, it is a 
very demanding one. The other principle is less controversial, but still problematic. In the 
international policy community, there is, at least in the abstract, consensus about something like 
the needs principle, expressed in the UNFCCC (1992, Art. 3.1). But the contentious issues arise in 
the specifications required to make the principle actionable. There are, for instance, different 
ways of satisfying basic needs: some based on fossil fuels, others on renewables. In order to 
evaluate such policy topics as climate finance, technology transfer and capacity-building, the 
basic needs principle must be more concretely specified. Then, more generally, the transition to 
a clean-energy economy raises normative questions about what means may be taken to that end 
(see Roser and Seidel 2017, chs. 18-20) that cannot be resolved merely by the needs principle. 
The challenge is to formulate transitional principles that are not too abstract and thus leave too 
much to the political process.  
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VI. Conclusion 
Having sorted out three different senses of non-ideal climate justice, it is natural to ask whether 
one or the other is more fruitful for future theorising.19 But to answer that I believe one needs a 
description of the political practices they are meant to regulate that is more detailed than what 
can be provided here (but see e.g. Keohane and Victor 2016). I can only note that as the Paris 
Agreement has entered into force, the structure of the main climate regime is now in place. As 
already noted, the overall ambition for the world at large and an approximate timetable for 
reaching it has been agreed on. Also other features of this institutional framework are likely to 
circumscribe the role and function of normative theories, although institutional reform and 
innovation of course are possible and probably necessary.  
The following normative question remains anyway: how to fairly distribute the burdens 
of a transition away from fossil fuels to sources of clean energy? The reviewed literature 
highlights some concerns important to consider in answering that. The discussion of 
noncompliance may seem hopelessly out of touch with the unfortunate state of climate politics, 
but still is a reminder that the action space is subject to change. What is politically infeasible 
today may be a central part of a political consensus tomorrow. That this is so raises questions 
about how such transitions come about. One suggestion is that it is by gradually realising an 
independently justified ideal theory. But as has been suggested above, such a view seems 
unrealistic, and furthermore could neglect normative complaints specific to the circumstances of 
this particular transition.  
It is more promising to take into account various feasibility constraints – psychological, 
institutional, and perhaps also those given by particular moral judgments – in formulating ideal 
principles. Elaborating on the reviewed literature, this can be done by formulating ideal 
principles specific to a particular context (e.g. the current climate regime) or conception of the 
agent in question (e.g. negotiating nation states), rather than assuming a more general scope. 
The challenge is to connect to the motivation of relevant actors so that normative principles 
guide their actions, without thereby uncritically accepting the status quo. Possibly, this can be 
addressed by providing a relatively thick description of what matters to the agents facing the 
distributive problem, the ones who must strike a fair deal. On common conceptions of fairness, 
such as ‘the original position’ (Rawls 1999), there is nothing that prevents a richer description of 
the person than what is standardly supplied in the literature on climate justice. Other factors 
than contribution, basic needs and ability to pay – such as co-benefits, competitiveness, and 
reputation – may partly determine what is a fair distribution of costs, even if they do not weigh 
equally.   
A final lesson from the above is that climate ethics better work towards the more 
concrete and particular. This could involve engaging in the kind of policy-relevant work that 
several of the theorists considered above suggest, but it could also extend to evaluating yet more 
concrete proposals, such as that of a feed-in tariff or an aviation tax. Beyond that, one can only 
conclude that the role of the climate ethicist in a just climate transition is still not clearly and 
convincingly articulated. 
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Notes 
                                                             
1 This is also the received interpretation of John Rawls’s (1999, p. 216) original presentation of 
the distinction (see e.g. Simmons 2010). 
2 For references see Hohl and Roser (2011, p. 478). The claim is implausible absent some moral 
justification for why the noncompliance of some should dissolve compliers’ obligations. 
Perhaps this could be provided (see Miller 2011), but as it stands it just collapses 
normative theory to a description of what agents are actually doing.  
3 ‘Burden’ here is understood in an encompassing way, including not only emission reductions, 
but also measures to adapt to climate change, as well as actions to promote and facilitate 
future solutions.  
4 Caney’s (2016a, p. 16) own ideal theory is a cosmopolitan egalitarianism, based on the 
capabilities framework. What matters fundamentally thus is that all present and future 
people have equal capabilities to lead a good life. The ultimate aim of any climate transition 
thus is to approximate such a fair distribution of life opportunities. 
5 See the overview provided by Roser and Seidel (2017). The most notable deviations are some 
defending a ‘beneficiary pays principle’ and some defending so-called ‘grandfathering’. 
6 See also Hohl and Roser (2011, pp. 495-497).  
 12 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
7 Shue (2014, ch. 15) similarly argues for climate leadership: In order to avoid paralysis, nation 
states are required to unilaterally do their fair share in mitigating climate change, even 
without promise that others will follow.  
8 See Caney’s (2012) compelling critique. Perhaps partly as a result of such criticism, the 
assumption is less commonplace in climate ethics today than it used to be.  
9 See also Light and Taraska (2016), who also discuss co-benefits of climate action, and Pickering 
(2016), who discusses strategic communication.  
10 But see Shue 2014, p. 210, for some possible objections. 
11 Several climate ethicists, such as John Broome, Lukas Meyer and Simon Caney, contributed to 
the latest IPCC (2014) report, in particular to WGIII, ch. 3 (‘Social, Economic, and Ethical 
Concepts and Methods’). 
12 An example of that is Christian Seidel’s (2016) proposal of a ‘government house climate 
ethics’, situated in the IPCC. The idea is in effect for the IPCC to act as a philosopher king, 
issuing normative recommendations to the political process. But this seems unpromising: 
not only would it likely be procedurally unfair, but also counterproductive. 
13 Whether or not it does so depends on how ethically acceptable application is understood. 
Traditional ideal theorists are also worried about that, as I described in section III. The 
difference, if any, is that whereas they have a fixed idea about what is ethically acceptable 
(namely, what their ideal theories prescribe), the alternative is to allow more particular 
judgments to play a justificatory role. To clarify: Kowarsch and Edenhofer (2016) do not 
make this point, but it is one way of making sense of their criticism against climate ethics.  
14 His main argument against ideal theory is that it is impractical to fully specify such a theory 
(2016, pp. 107-110). But he does not say anything about what is wrong with those already 
specified ideal theories, such as the one from Caney considered above. In what sense, if any, 
are they impractical? 
15 Note that since the UNFCCC was first drafted and signed in 1992, some of these countries have 
had strong economic development, with the result of higher standards of living but also 
higher GHG emission levels. In 2006, China surpassed the US as the world biggest absolute 
emitter of GHGs, yet it is still a Non-Annex I Party. 
16 Note that also a technological solution, which likely involves quite some political steering, is 
bound to meet resistance from vested interests in the fossil fuel economy. The claim is just 
that it is more feasible than the alternative of just stop using fossil fuels. 
17 My rendition of transitional theory thus differs from Valentini’s (2012), according to which it 
concerns what gradual steps of justice-improvement can be taken, possibly without 
consulting an end-state theory. 
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18 Amartya Sen (2009) presents a more explicit argument for why ideal theory (what he calls 
‘the transcendental approach’) is neither necessary nor sufficient for such comparative 
judgments. 
19 Note a more general conclusion suggested by the discussion above: the distinction is rather 
blurry. If there are different kinds of non-ideal theory, they are likely rather similar in 
structure and extension. 
 14 
References 
Barry, B., 2003. Sustainability and intergenerational justice. In: A. Light and H. Rolston III, eds. 
Environmental ethics. An anthology. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 487-499.  
Caney, S., 2005. Cosmopolitan justice, responsibility, and global climate change. Leiden journal of 
international law, 18 (4), 747-775. 
Caney, S., 2012. Just emissions. Philosophy & public affairs, 40 (4), 255-300.  
Caney, S., 2016a. The struggle for climate justice in a nonideal world. Midwest studies in 
philosophy, 40 (1), 9–26. 
Caney, S., 2016b. Climate change and non-ideal theory: six ways of responding to non-
compliance. In: C. Heyward and D. Roser, eds. Climate justice in a non-ideal world. Oxford: 
Oxford university press, 21–42. 
Gajevic Sayegh, A., 2016. Justice in a non-ideal world: the case of climate change. Critical review 
of international social and political philosophy.  
Heyward, C. and Roser, D., eds., 2016. Climate justice in a non-ideal world. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Hohl, S. and Roser D., 2011. Stepping in for the polluters? Climate justice under partial 
compliance. Analyse & kritik, 33 (2), 477–500. 
Intergovernmental panel on climate change (IPCC). 2014. Fifth assessment report: working group 
III (Mitigation of climate change). Cambridge: Cambridge university press. 
Keohane, R. O. and Victor, D. G., 2016. Cooperation and discord in global climate policy. Nature 
climate change, 6, 570-575. 
Kowarsch, M. and Edenhofer, O., 2016. Principles of pathways? Improving the contribution of 
philosophical ethics to climate policy. In: C. Heyward and D. Roser, eds. Climate justice in 
a non-ideal world. Oxford: Oxford university press, 296–317. 
Light, A. and Taraska G., 2016. A responsible path: enhancing action on short-lived climate 
pollutants. In: C. Heyward and D. Roser, eds. Climate justice in a non-ideal world. Oxford: 
Oxford university press, 169–188. 
Maltais, A., 2013. Radically non-ideal climate politics and the obligation to at least vote green. 
Environmental values, 22 (5), 589–608. 
Maltais, A., 2014. Failing international climate politics and the fairness of going first. Political 
studies, 62 (3), 618-633. 
Maltais, A., 2016. A climate of disorder: what to do about the obstacles to effective climate 
politics. In: C. Heyward and D. Roser, eds. Climate justice in a non-ideal world. Oxford: 
Oxford university press, 43–63. 
 15 
Moellendorf, D., 2016. Taking UNFCCC norms seriously. In: C. Heyward and D. Roser, eds. Climate 
justice in a non-ideal world. Oxford: Oxford university press, 104–121. 
Miller, D., 2011. Taking up the slack? Responsibility and justice in situations of partial 
compliance. In: C. Knight and Z. Stemplowska, eds. Responsibility and distributive justice. 
Oxford: Oxford university press, 230-245. 
Pickering, J., 2016. Moral language in climate politics. In: C. Heyward and D. Roser, eds. Climate 
justice in a non-ideal world. Oxford: Oxford university press, 255–276. 
Rawls, J., 1999. A theory of justice, rev edn. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, [1971] 1999. 
Roser, D., 2016. Reducing injustice within the bounds of motivation. In: C. Heyward and D. Roser, 
eds. Climate justice in a non-ideal world. Oxford: Oxford university press, 83–103. 
Roser, D. and Seidel, C., 2017. Climate justice: an introduction. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. 
Seidel, C. 2016. The cost of moralizing: how about a ‘government house climate ethics’? In: C. 
Heyward and D. Roser, eds. Climate justice in a non-ideal world. Oxford: Oxford university 
press, 277–295. 
Sen, A. 2009. The idea of justice. London: Allen lane/Penguin books. 
Shue, H., 2014. Climate justice: vulnerability and protection. Oxford: Oxford university Press. 
Simmons, J., 2010. Ideal and nonideal theory. Philosophy & public affairs, 38 (1), 5-36. 
UNFCCC, 1992. United Nations framework convention on climate change. 
http://unfccc.int/key_documents/the_convention/items/2853.php 
UNFCCC, 2015. Adoption of the Paris Agreement. Report No. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf 
Valentini, L., 2012. Ideal vs. non-ideal theory: a conceptual map. Philosophy compass 7 (9), 654–
664. 
